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8. Leadership and Governance  
Competitive Session  
The Failure of Strategic Initiatives: 
Perceptions of Leaders, Managers & Employees  
Peter McKiernan and David MacKay, University of Strathclyde 
Abstract: 
Strategic initiatives fail for many reasons. We examine such failure in a major UK-based single site case. 
We discover the influence of differing perceptions of the strategic initiatives across hierarchical levels, 
from leaders on the executive board to operational managers and frontline staff, RQ DQ RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
dynamic capability. Adopting an issue management perspective, we present data from a single case study 
in which differing views between leaders triggering the strategic initiatives and those close to 
operationalizing them, resulted in a lack of dynamic capability. This is explained by an absence of 
procedural rationality ± a concept reflecting the extent to which a decision-making process and its results 
are perceived as sensible and relevant. We argue that procedural rationality, enabled by social interaction 
between hierarchical levels, is vital to building employee commitment to purposeful change and 
organizational dynamic capability.  
Keywords: Dynamic Capability, Issue Management, Procedural Rationality, Communication, 
Commitment 
 ³There are truths this side of the Pyrenees, which are falsehoods on the RWKHU´Blaise Pascal 
When strategic initiatives by the leaders on an executive board consistently fail, what does that tell us 
about communication and commitment within the wider organization? Employing an issue management 
perspective and concepts of dynamic capability and procedural rationality, this paper attempts to address 
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this question through analysis of empirical data from a UK-based site of a FTSE listed engineering 
services firm experiencing serial strategic initiative failure. 
Clear, symmetrical communication and consistent commitment require the alignment of actor cognition 
and emotion with strategic initiatives. Simon (1976) argues that this is best achieved through the 
SV\FKRORJLVW¶V QRWLRQ of procedural rationality; and this might be made more effective by balancing it 
ZLWKWKHODZ\HU¶VQRWLRQRIprocedural justice (Thibault and Walker, 1975). Here, actors acknowledge that 
the strategic decision-making process and its initiatives are sensible and explainable and enacted within 
WKHDFFHSWHGµUXOHVRI WKHJDPH¶. Hence, each can articulate what the decisions are and why they have 
been made, whether they agree with them or not (Eden & Ackermann, 2001). Thus, an intelligent process 
minimises the possibility that any decision and initiative will fail (Nutt, 2002) and helps build dynamic 
capabilities by supporting organisations to ³FUHDWHH[WHQGRUPRGLI\ WKH UHVRXUFHEDVH´ +HOIDWHWDOLD
2007).  According to the formative mantra of the resource-based view of the firm, excellent dynamic 
capabilities support superior performance through non-imitability, ceteris paribus. 
In this paper, we ask why such processes and initiatives and their underlying capability building can fail 
in organisations. We adopt an issues management perspective1 to examine a major UK organisational site, 
where an apparent lack of dynamic capability building led to the direct failure of eight of the executive 
OHDGHUVKLS¶V2 strategic initiatives. Following Dutton et alia (2001), we evaluate qualitatively the emerging 
patterns within a total of 1327 issues that were nominated in the course of 14 strategy workshops, 
conducted across several hierarchical levels of the case organization. From our analysis of the issues 
nominated, we identify an apparent dichotomy in the profile of strategic change needs suggested at 
different hierarchical levels within the site. We find that the EL (2% of the organizational population), 
whose continuing knowledge of the operation at the case site was based nearly exclusively on 
                                                          
1 :KHUHLVVXHVDUH³WKHLQWXLWLRQVIUXVWUDWLRQVDQGFODLPV>DQRUJDQLVDWLRQDOSDUWLFLSDQW@PDNHVDERXWZKDt needs to 
be done to ensure success or failure (Ackermann & Eden, 2011, p40) 
2
 We use the term executive leadership (EL) to refer to the directors and heads of department comprising the 
extended executive board for the site 
3 of 22 
 
management information reporting, align behind an issue profile that emphasises extensive sense-giving 
activities and activities that deal with perceived problems. In contrast, those organizational actors with 
direct involvement in operations at the site (the operational managers (OM) and employees (E) 
representing 98% of WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VVWDIILQJQXPEHUV), align behind an issue profile that emphasises a 
need to take actions to reconfigure existing assets and better exploit existing opportunities. 
Considering further qualitative data about the introduction and focus of strategic initiatives, we find that 
the common factor in the failed initiatives was a lack of operational manager (OM) and employee (E) 
commitment. %\ WKLVZHPHDQ WKDW WKURXJK µomission and commission¶ (Clegg, Carter, Kornberger & 
Schweitzer, 2011), the majority of organizational actors brought about the failure of the initiatives, 
despite otherwise having the understanding and available resources to operationalize them effectively. 
Further, we find that the strategic initiatives instigated by the EL, who were removed mainly from direct 
operations, lacked a sense of procedural rationality for the vast majority of the organization.  
From our empirical analysis, we propose implications for our understanding of how to work with such 
leader-generated initiatives. Specifically, our findings suggest that direct contact with the managers at the 
operational level has a profound impact on what makes sense as purposeful change in an organization. 
Furthermore, wKHQVHHNLQJWRµGHSOR\¶G\QDPLFFDSDELOLW\WKURXJKVWUDWHJLFLQLWLDWLYHVZHare mindful of 
0LQW]EHUJ¶V  REVHUYDWLRQ WKDW ³FDOFXODWHG VWUDWHJLHV KDYH QR YDOXH LQ DQG RI WKHPVHOYHV «
6WUDWHJLHVWDNHRQYDOXHRQO\DVFRPPLWWHGSHRSOHLQIXVHWKHPZLWKHQHUJ\´.  
Finally, we assert that dynamic capability cannot be considered a timeless potential for action that can be 
directed by leaders towards any end - for dynamic capability to be available to those leading an 
organization, the purposeful change must resonate with those required to enact it. Proposed initiatives 
must make sense to those beyond the EL team and, therefore, attending to procedural rationality 
considerations may play a useful role in building commitment between hierarchical levels to formal 
strategy activities (Vilà & Canales, 2008). 
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We propose that the usefulness of dynamic capability as a managerial decision making aid may be 
enhanced by considering it as a situated phenomenon, tied to the specific context of an intended change 
initiative. This leads us to suggest that to work with dynamic capability in practice will require a situated, 
multi-perspective evaluation and explanation of purposeful change options each and every time a 
deployment is mooted.  
The remainder of the paper deals with the pertinent literature, the chosen method, the discussion and 
conclusion. 
Literature Background 
This section defines the key concepts underpinning our study and outlines the existing theory which we 
seek to extend. First, we adopt an µLVVXHPDQDJHPHQW perspective¶,03 in attempting to understand how 
perceptions of strategic initiatives differ between actors at different levels i.e. what each articulate as 
sensible and relevant activities that are to be prioritised in future work. In this context, issues are 
practitioner SHUFHSWLRQV RI ³HYHQWV GHYHORSPHQWV DQG WUHQGV WKDW KDYH LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU RUJDQL]DWLRQDO
SHUIRUPDQFH´'XWWRQ&Ashford, 1993, p397). Dutton et al. (2001, p716) note that ³RUJDQL]DWLRQVDUHD
cacophony of complementary and competing change attempts, with managers at all levels joining the fray 
and pushing for issues of partiFXODU LPSRUWDQFH WR WKHPVHOYHV´. In this bustling organizational context, 
iVVXHPDQDJHPHQWUHODWHVWRDFWLYLWLHVLQWHQGHGWRUHVROYHWKH³LQWXLWLRQVIUXVWUDWLRQVDQGFODLPV´PDGH
by practitioners as to how current resources might be best utilised to either address 
troublesome/threatening matters or better grasp extant opportunities (Ackermann and Eden, 2011, p40). 
These suggestions might be to continue to execute existing activities either to solve problems or exploit 
favourable circumstances. 
Second, we examine how this impacts upon the building of dynamic capability. Dynamic capability can 
be understood as an organizational level capability ± or potential for action (Kay, 2010) - that may change 
organizational resources or operational capabilities (Winter, 2003; Regner, 2008). Dynamic capability is 
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argued to emerge from organizational processes (Teece, Pisano & Shuen., 1997; Helfat & Peteraf, 2009) 
which, in turn, are a product of organizational structures and systems and the routines and actions of 
organizational actors (Leiblein, 2011; McKelvie & Davidsson, 2009; Pentland, Feldman, Becker & Liu,  
2012; Teece, 2012).  
Activities associated with the deployment of dynamic capability include the addition of resources from 
outside the organization (e.g. through procurement activities), the creation of new resources internally 
(typically knowledge-based resources created through learning or entrepreneurial activities), resource 
reconfiguration (changing the way resources are used in combination in order to change their realised 
impact) and resource deletion (e.g. through divestment activities) (Teece et al, 1997; Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000;  Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Zahra, Sapienza & Davidsson, 2006; Helfat et al, 2007; Teece, 
2007). Where issues expressed by organizational participants relate to purposeful change through the 
addition, creation, reconfiguration or deletion of resources, we understand those issues as a call to build 
dynamic capability. 
The final categories of issues we consider are those recommending sensemaking or sensegiving 
activities. Sensemaking involves communication and perception and occurs when we receive information 
which contradicts our established way of thinking about the world (our schemata) and, through 
introspection and reflection as an individual or through dialogue with others, we seek to redefine our 
schemata in light of the new information (Weick, 1995, 2001). Sensemaking is important to dynamic 
capability by reducing uncertainty for managers seeking to initiative strategic change (Pandza & Thorpe, 
2009) and by providing leaders with a crucial role in determining the type of dynamic capability in their 
organization (Zahra et al., 2006; Teece, 2007; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). Finally, sensemaking is 
important for the acceptance of a µneed to change¶ for all employees, regardless of level (Balogun & 
Johnson; 2004, 2005), as part of escaping the LQHUWLDO³JURRYHV´RIKDELWXDORUJDQL]DWLRQDODFWLYLW\ WKDW
can diminish the building of dynamic capability (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000, p1113). 
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Sensegiving is an activity through which an individual expresses their views to others in an attempt to 
influence the sensemaking of those others towards sharing their own schemata (Weick, 1995; 2001; 
Rouleau, 2005). In terms of dynamic capability, sensegiving activities are part of a deployment and 
communications process in which the decisions of a set of agents, such as a leadership team, are promoted 
to a larger network of organizational actors capable of implementing the change (Pandza & Thorpe, 
7KURXJKVHQVHJLYLQJDFWLYLWLHVWKRVHPDNLQJVWUDWHJLFGHFLVLRQVFDQDWWHPSWWR³JDUQHUOR\DOW\DQG
FRPPLWPHQWDQGDFKLHYHDGKHUHQFH´WRWKHLUSXUSRVHIXOLQLWLDWLYHV7HHFHS1334). Arguably, the 
greater the effort to commitment building, the greater the likelihood of strategic initiatives being realised 
and dynamic capability being built successfully (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). 
In the application of an issue management perspective, we seek to draw on the concepts summarised in 
Table 1 to examine how differing perceptions of strategic issues across hierarchical levels might impact 
on the building of dynamic capability.  
>,QVHUW³7DEOH± 2UJDQL]LQJFRQFHSWV´+HUH@ 
This paper responds to a call for research that, in contrast to rationalist, economically-grounded views, 
addresses the impact on dynamic capability of the perceptions and limitations of EL, OM and E-level 
staff as cognate, social beings within an organizational system (McGuinness & Morgan, 2000; Helfat et 
al, 2007; Augier & Teece, 2008; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). This matters practically as well as 
theoretically for, as Helfat et al (2007, p48) observe, dynamic capability LVVXEMHFW WR³IRUFHVRI LQHUWLD
and change tKDW RSHUDWH DOPRVW LQGHSHQGHQWO\ RI WKH HYHU\GD\ DFWLRQV DQG LQDFWLRQV RI H[HFXWLYHV´
Dynamic capability is determined, in part, by how individuals communicate and exchange ideas, 
information and influence between hierarchical levels (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Blyler & Coff, 2003; Kay, 
2010). So, in developing an understanding of its building blocks, it has been argued that researchers 
should look beyond the leadership team and consider all agents involved in the strategic initiative, and the 
relationships between those operating at different organizational levels  (Bruni and Verona, 2009; Pavlou 
7 of 22 
 
and El Sawy, 2011). The ways in which interactions between organizational levels affect dynamic 
capability remains under-investigated and, in exploring our research question, we will provide some 
insights. 
Methods and Fieldwork 
Our study is informed by qualitative empirical data gathered from a single organizational site of a division 
of a multi-national engineering (MNE) services provider WR WKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶V0LQLVWUy of Defence. 
Located in the West of Scotland, UK, the organizational unit employed approximately 1200 full time staff 
across fifteen different functions (split between technical and administrative directives). These directives 
provided facilities management, logistical support and operating services for a military base that was 
GHHPHGE\WKH8.JRYHUQPHQWDVDFHQWUDODVVHWLQWKH8.¶VPLOLWDU\response-readiness capacity. The 
organizational unit examined has been in existence for approximately a century, although it only came 
under control of the MNE organization a decade ago after an outsourcing move by the UK government (a 
department of which previously ran the unit). 
The authors have an established relationship with the organization, having worked with managers and 
staff on a range of technical and management engagements over the past eight years. The data informing 
this paper was gathered as part of a collaborative research programme on strategic management, initiated 
early in 2011. We engage in case study research, where we seek to interpret specific detail in depth from a 
single site as a means to build theory and improve understanding of social phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Costello, 2000; Stake, 2000). Data was collected from the organization between May 2011 and October 
2011- as dictated by the operational demands of staff, and focussed upon the strategic initiatives over the 
period 2009-2011.  
The forum for raw data collection was a series of 14 causal mapping workshops, each lasting 2-3 hours, 
where actors were asked about their views of what constitutes matters of importance for the future for the 
organization and specifically: ³At this site, what should we do in the next 5 years?´ Participation was 
8 of 22 
 
entirely voluntary and 112 actors (c. 10% of the workforce at the site) opted to attend one of the 14 
sessions. At the request of the organization, workshops were scheduled for homogeneity of level of actor 
within three broad hierarchical groupings ±executive leadership (EL), operational management (OM) and 
employees (E). This workshop structure and number of attendees is represented in Table 2.  
>,QVHUW³7DEOH ± 3DUWLFLSDQW:RUNVKRS2YHUYLHZ´+HUH@ 
Causal maps are an effective way of collecting ideas about the strategic future (Ambrosini and Bowman, 
2005). We constructed causal maps in a software program - Decision Explorer (Shaw et al, 2003; Eden 
and Ackermann, 2004). Each issue suggested by participants was captured as a discrete concept (boxes) 
written in a short phrase format starting with a verb (achieving this format was a key aim of the facilitated 
process). Also captured was any statement of perceived influence between issues, as determined by 
participants, represented with causal linkages (arrows). Figure 1, below, shows a sample extract from a 
workshop causal map containing 21 concepts and 26 links. 
[,QVHUW³)LJXUH1-6DPSOH([WUDFWIURP:RUNVKRS&DXVDO0DS´KHUH@ 
Once a map was developed, both workshop facilitators and participants reviewed its content to ensure that 
the form of the map was an accurate representation of the points raised. Particular emphasis was placed 
on checking that the verb captured in each concept correctly reflected participant views of which actions 
should be undertaken. In total, through the 14 workshop sessions, 1327 concepts and 2415 linkages were 
identified, distributed across hierarchical levels as indicated in Table 3.  
>,QVHUW³Table 3 ± Summary Characteristics Of Hierarchical Level Workshop Causal Maps´KHUH@ 
Then, the nominated issues from the workshops were manually coded against the schema and concepts 
described in the literature review and summarised in Table 1.  Following the lead of Dutton et al (2001), 
the coded data set was then summarised using simple counts and percentages to qualitatively characterise 
the issues prioritised at each hierarchical level as a means of addressing our initial research question. The 
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results of this coding and analytical process are shown in Table 4 and Figures 2 and 3, below. This 
analysis was then used to identify points for discussion relating to the strategic views and perceptions 
surfaced at, and between, hierarchical levels in our specific case in relation to dynamic capability. 
[Insert ³Table 4 ± &RXQWVLVVXHFDWHJRULHVDQGFRQFHSWVDWHDFKKLHUDUFKLFDOOHYHO´@ 
[Insert ³)LJXre 2 ± &RPSDULQJ&DWHJRULHVRI,VVXHVDW(DFK+LHUDUFKLFDO/HYHO´@ 
>,QVHUW³)LJXUH± &RPSDULQJ,VVXH&RQFHSWV,GHQWLILHGDW(DFK+LHUDUFKLFDO/HYHO´@ 
,QUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHTXHVWLRQ³$WWKLVVLWHZKDWVKRXOGZHGRLQWKHQH[W\HDUV"´ at the category level 
of response, the profile of nominated issues of those outside of the EL group emphasises the undertaking 
of purposeful change activities and de-emphasises actions relating to deciding and influencing, 
particularly within the E grouping. In comparison, the EL group, advocated a more balanced mix of 
categories of activity. At an organizing concept level, the issue profile amongst non-EL groups shows a 
strong emphasis on activities to reconfigure resources and the better exploiting of opportunities, whereas 
the EL group emphasises activities in sensegiving, handling issues and to a lesser extent, sensemaking. 
Overall, the issue management profile of the E and OM levels - two organizational groupings with high 
exposure to operational activity-  appeared to align in terms of the order of categories and concepts 
prioritised. The EL group did not share this profile.  In the following section, we discuss the implications 
of these different issue management profiles across hierarchical levels in terms of their impact on 
dynamic capability. 
Discussion 
Through the course of the workshop sessions, actors at all levels named the eight major strategic 
initiatives for the site from the past two years which had been started but had not been followed through 
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or had failed to deliver their original objectives3. Evidence suggests that analogous initiatives in the 
previous five years had succeeded.  For example, a strategic initiative to introduce a lean manufacturing 
approach in the service operations area had been abandoned quietly DIWHUDERXWD\HDU¶VHIIRUWVZKHUHDV
an initiative, of similar scope and involving most of the same personnel, to install a TQM approach had 
been successfully executed five years before. In the terms of this paper, we suggest that during our period 
of enquiry the organization was lacking the building blocks of dynamic capability. 
Why were there differing issue profiles at the different hierarchical levels, and do they help explain the 
lack of dynamic capability? Non-EL levels appeared to draw extensively on insights gained from their 
daily experiences of managing/delivering the operation when nominating issues. The emphasis that these 
hierarchical levels placed on change-oriented action generally, and reconfiguration action specifically, at 
a sub-category level aligns with many specific examples espoused in the individual workshops of 
currently underperforming resources/ capabilities perceived as needing modified by those practitioners 
that use them or engage with them on a daily basis. 
In contrast, evidence from the workshop conversations suggested that executive leaders did not use direct 
H[SHULHQFH RU HQJDJHPHQW RI WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V RSHUDWLRQ widely when nominating strategic activities. 
This is not to say that they GLGQ¶WGUDZRQdaily experiences when suggesting issues. For example, in the 
EL workshop discussions, daily experience of dealing with clients (both external customers and internal 
µFRUSRUDWH¶ customers) was referred to regularly in explanation of issue nomination. Much of this daily 
experience related to organizational politics and the management of perceptions and influence. However, 
there was clearly a lacuna in the experiential understanding of the daily operation for most EL 
participants. During the workshops, the EL community discussed the extensive use of internal reporting 
mechanisms as the key source of information about the operation underpinning their strategic 
management activity and initiative planning.  
                                                          
3
 During the period of study (2009-2011), eight non-compliance strategic initiatives failed. There is some evidence 
that the one compliance issue (health and safety) could succeed-as it had to be completed for legal reasons. 
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One might have expected OM perceptions to be a hybrid of EL and employee level views but, they were 
skewed mainly towards the E level views. In the OM workshop sessions, there was a palpable sense of 
frustration at the lack of EL recognition/attention of local matters, which might have major significance 
for the organization (and also the operational results of managers). For example, one manager described 
in detail how the technical operation in the area that he managed was able to offer a range of services for 
which demand exceeded supply nationally (and thus revenue generating potential was high) but, he could 
not get the EL to listen to his ideas as to how to exploit this commercial opportunity. Instead, all he was 
permitted to do was participate in a portfolio of strategic initiatives in which he could see no explainable 
link to the local needs of his area of the business. This example is representative of the views expressed 
extensively by participants across non-EL levels i.e. that they did not need to be told what to do in their 
own areas, as they already knew what to do from hard experience!  
A commonly expressed opinion in workshop conversations was that the strategic initiatives launched by 
EL VLPSO\GLGQ¶WPDNHVHQVHand there was a consistent lack of articulation of justification of initiatives 
as relevant to the future needs of the site. Across the vast majority of the organization, the quality of 
reasoning behind strategic decision making was constantly called into question, as the EL team failed 
continually to offer convincing explanations.  
Procedural rationality is a concept that refers to the degree to which participants can cognitively commit 
to outcomes agreed through a decision making process because they perceive the process and outcomes to 
be a product of publicly- stated reasoning. Perceptions of procedural rationality are likely to follow when 
³WKHSURFHGXUHVXVHGIRUVWUDWHJ\PDNLQJPDNHVHQVHLQWKHPVHOYHV± they are coherent, follow a series of 
VWHSV HDFK VWHS LV LWVHOI XQGHUVWRRG QRW RSDTXH DQG UHODWHV WR WKH SULRU DQG IXWXUH VWHSV´ (GHQ & 
Ackermann, 1998, p55). In terms of building employee commitment, procedural rationality is a key 
component of garnering support for the implementation of strategic initiatives.  In our case, there was a 
dearth of procedural rationality relating to the instigation of strategic initiatives which, given the schism 
in issue profiling between EL and non-EL levels, ZDVGDPDJLQJ WR WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶Vcapacity to build 
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dynamic capability. Whilst the leadership team were able to generate a strategy µon paper¶ through their 
own deliberations, their failure to explain how their decisions were made harmed the credibility of the 
strategic initiatives and commitment of the remaining 98% of the organization required to deliver the 
changes. 
In relation to explaining poor perceptions of procedural rationality, a recurring theme was the lack of EL 
µSK\VLFDO¶ SUHVHQFH DURXQG WKH VLWH KLJKOLJKWHG E\ E and OM levels. This would seem to have denied 
senior managers informal opportunities to communicate with those engaged with the organization. Non-
EL participants expressed the consistent view that increasing the level of social interaction, particularly 
LQIRUPDO DQG µZLWKRXW DJHQGD¶ EHWZHHQ EL and OM and E levels beyond the annual strategy 
dissemination, would have enabled opportunities for better understanding as to why strategic change was 
necessary and why the nominated initiatives were being taken forward. Furthermore, such interactions 
would have enabled those in EL to gain an increased experiential understanding of the direct operation as 
an input to future strategy making work. 
By moving to a more balanced form of strategizing, drawing on both inductive and deductive modes of 
strategy making in the leadership team (Regner, 2003), the dynamic capability of the organization might 
have been enhanced. Indeed, by increasing the degree of interaction between leadership and the rest of the 
organization, communication of strategic reasoning and associated increased perceived levels of 
rationality could have deliver improved commitment to strategy implementation efforts across 
hierarchical levels. ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV G\QDPLF FDSDELOLW\ FRXOG KDYH EHHQ IRVWHUHG E\ ³LQWHJUDWLQJ DQG
UHFRQFLOLQJWKHLQWHUHVWV´RIEL and non-EL levels, building commitment to strategic initiatives through 
open, compelling argument making and dialogue (Vilà & Canales, 2008, p285). 
Conclusion 
Our study carries the well accepted caveat that use of a single case study limits generalizability.  
However, having examined data using an organizing framework compiled from several bodies of 
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literature, we believe that there is a case for analytical generalizability (Yin, 2003) that would be 
strengthened by replication studies in alternative case organizations and by a comparison with the 
previous era in this case site, when strategy initiatives were successful. Our study suggests that: a) 
differing views of what matters strategically between hierarchical levels can inhibit commitment to 
strategic change efforts and that, b) this limits the building of dynamic capability, particularly when there 
is a perceived lack of procedural rationality in the proposed initiatives and, c) that where executive 
leadership teams espouse mostly sense-making with some sense-giving, the novel notion of effective 
µVHQVH-UHFHLYLQJ¶ amongst operational actors at lower levels should be considered. Sense receiving 
FRQFHSWVDQGSURFHVVHVDUHDEVHQW LQ WKH µVHQVH¶ OLWHUDWXUHV HJ:HLFN; McKiernan et al, 
2013) in strategic management and our results suggest that further theoretical and empirical research on 
WKHµUHFHLYLQJ¶HOHPHQWis called for that combines the strategy, psychology and communications domains. 
Developing our theoretical understanding of effective strategic communication and sense-receiving is 
important practically, as the serial failure of strategic initiatives will jeopardise not just executive 
leadership reputations, but the dynamic capability ± and thus adaptation potential and survival prospects ± 
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Add (from external) 
Create (new from internal) 
Reconfigure (modify existing resource set-up) 
Remove (existing resources) 
Deciding and Influencing 
Sensemake (develop new understanding of situation) 
Sensegive (shape the interpretation of others) 
Use Existing 
Exploit opportunities (deliver better results with existing set-up) 
Handle Problems (resolve potential problems with existing set-up) 
 
Table 1 ± Summary of Organizing Concepts 
 
Table 2 ± Participant Workshop Overview 
 
Level Concepts Linkages 
Executive Leadership 442 743 
Operational Management 443 947 
Employee 442 725 
Total 1327 2415 
 

















Employee (E) Employees 51 6 
3OHDVHQRWHWKHRUGHURIWKHHQWULHVLQWKHVHFRQGFROXPQWLWOHG³&RPSULVLQJ´UHIOHFWVWKHKLHUDUFKLFDO
reporting structure in the organization (e.g multiple employees report to a team leader; multiple team 
leaders report to a manager; multiple managers report to a Head of Department etc.) 
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Add 23 17 12 
Create 45 49 50 
Reconfigure 101 112 60 
Remove 47 44 32 
Deciding and 
Influencing 
Sensemake 39 53 66 
Sensegive 48 50 91 
Use Existing Exploit 83 73 54 
Handle Problems 56 45 77 
 Totals 442 443 442 
 
Table 4 ± Counts issue categories and concepts at each hierarchical level 
 
 
Figure 1 ± Sample Extract from Workshop Causal Map 
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Figure 2 ± Comparing Categories of Issues at Each Hierarchical Level 
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Figure 3± Comparing Issue Concepts Identified at Each Hierarchical Level 
